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STATEl\IENT OF NATURE OF CASE 
The appellant, Texaco, Inc., appeals from the 
denial of its motion for summary judgment by the 
Honorable ]3ryaut H. Croft, District .Judge. The 
1 
appeal is on interlocutory order granted by this Court 
on 28 July 1966. 
DISPOSITION IX lAYNEll COURT 
On September 3rd, I!J(;;'), the respondent Don 
Foster filed suit in the District Court of Salt Lake 
County against Elmo J. Steed and Gordon '\Theeler 
as individuals and partners, and against their partner-
ship S & W Texaco Senice (R. 1). Suit was also 
brought against Texaco, luc. The suit was for damages 
in compensation for burn injuries sustained by the 
respondent at th eS & '\T Texaco Service, Inc., in Boun-
tiful, Utah on lVIay 21, 1964 (R. 1-3). Answer was 
filed by the partnership and the individual defendants, 
however, the record does not reJiect that Texaco, Inc., 
the appellant herein, ever filed an answer to respond-
ent's complaint. Subsequently, interrogatories were 
served and depositions taken by all parties. On October 
22, 1965, the appellant filed a Motion for Summary 
Judgment on behalf of .Texaco, Inc. (R. 16). The 
matter was heard on the 29th day of .March, 1966, and 
memorandums were submitted b? the parties. On July 
15, 1966, Judge Croft entered an order denying the 
appellant's motion for summar~r judgment on the 
grounds: 
" ... it cannot be said that there is no genuine 
issue as to anv material fact or facts concerning 
the relationsl{ip between Texaco, Inc. and the 
other defendants in the operation of the service 
station here involved. and in the opinion of the 
cou~t, additional factors helpful in determining 
the issue can be more fully dveloped by evidence 
and testimony upon trial." 
On July 13, 1965, two days before entry of the 
trial court's order, the appellant filed a petition for 
interlocutory appeal. On July 28, 1965, this Court 
issued its order allowing the appeal. 
RELIEF SOuGHT ON APPEAL 
The respondent submits the interlocutory appeal 
should be dismissed as improvidently granted, or that 
the trial court's decision should be affirmed and the 
case remanded for trial with all parties being given an 
opportunity to be heard. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
The respondent submits the following statement 
of facts as being more in keeping with the rule that 
the evidence under circumstances like those in the instant 
case will be viewed in a light most favorable to the trial 
court's judgment.(1) 
The respondent, Don Foster, is a thirty-year-old 
father of three children, and a self-employed stone 
mason. (F 3, 4). On May 21, 1964<, he entered the S & 
"\i\T Texaco Service Station in Bountiful, Utah at about 
(1) The record will be cited as R, ~le? •:lcposition of respon~E'.nt, 
Don Foster, a.<o F, th" deposition pf J\Tr. S1c·,•cl 3S S, 1he depos1t10n 
of Mr. Whcele1· i.lS v,r, and 1hc (1ClJOS;'i· r; ·Jr r.1r. Simmons of 
Texaco as T. 
J 
6 :30 P .lH. ( F 6, 7). He helped push a Plymouth auto-
mobile into the station garage. 1\fr. Wheeler, a partner 
in the service station operation, or one of his assistants 
asked the respondent to prime the carburetor of the 
car by pouring gas into it. They assured him it would 
not explode. ( F 8, 9) . Respondent complied with the 
request. The gasoline ignited, setting respondent on 
fire. He jumped back and tripped on a pan of gasoline 
on the floor of the service station, filled with gasoline 
and being used to clear parts. ( F. 11) . As a result, the 
respondent sustained serious burns for which the instant 
action was commenced . 
.J\!Ir. Foster, in his deposition, testified that there 
was a large Texaco sign at the station, and that a sign 
over the station read "S & "r Texaco Service". (F. 19). 
The depositions of Gordon G. 'Vheeler and Elmo 
J. Steed were taken by the plaintiff. Mr. Steed indi-
cated that he had been with Texaco stations for about 
twenty years, and in addition to the station involved 
in the instant litigation, he was operating another 
Texaco station under his own name. ( S. 6). He stated 
that as between he and lVIr. 'Vheeler there were no 
articles of partnership, nor had a notice of doing busi-
ness under an assumed name been filed with the Sec-
retary of State. (S. 5). He stated that Mr. 'Vheeler 
had gone to a school conducted by Texaco for about 
30 days shortly after they started to operate the sta-
tion. ( S. 7). At the school, training hints and safety 
instructions were given. ( S. 7), and Texaco was always 
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"giving you instructions on safety .... " (S. 7). He 
stated that using gasoline to clean parts would bf_: 
contrary to Texaco instructions. ( S. 10). He i11<licated 
that Texaco personnel came around regularly at the 
station, and that after the fire they painted the station 
(S. 11).<1) 
l\Ir. Wheeler testified that he was one of the persons 
running the S & \V Texaco station. A lease with Texaco 
had been executed on May 28, 1962 ( \\r. 4, 5, Exhibit 
A, R. 51). 
Mr. VVheeler indicated he attended a school for 
thirty days conducted by Texaco at Murray, Utah (W. 
5, 24). At the school he was given safety instruction 
and thought there probably was instruction on the use 
of gasoline as a cleaning agent (R. 24). At the time 
of taking .Mr. 'Vheeler's deposition, counsel for appel-
lant and vVheeler refused to allow 'Vheeler to discuss 
whether Texaco had placed any restrictions on the 
length of time the station could be closed. Further, a 
copy of an agreement terminating the lease with Texaco 
was never produced at the time that 'Vheeler's depo-
sition was taken (W. 29) <2) Mr. 'Vheeler indicated 
Texaco would send people around regularly and these 
( 1) At this poin: co1~n"'1 :.,r aprell~rnt an'l Ste'":1 ins'.ructed 
hin1 not to c1ns1i'/er 2~1J fur;_ncr c:i__1csti 1l1S, L1kint~ lhe position 
that evidence of subseqt1en >. c:1a:'.1_!,?S w '5 1~ot :< YJ.issible. While 
this is true if foe evidence; lS 10 ohow rYi'l" ;-ic_:,ligence, it is not 
so if it shows the cx'cen: of v111" i o 1 by Te:;::a"~o. 1· ~cCormick Evi-
dence P. 544 (1954); :U11hc:n0~,._ c::i '-'· Howar'.1 Savings Inst., 124 
N.JL 368 12A2d 384 (1941). 
(2) This agrcC'rncnt is ;i]o:o nc.:. a p~ ,., of the rcc:i£d on appeal, 
;ilthough tt"'l"C is ~-o;_-c cvidcnJ' ii: \\;cs ::d\FC ihc Court below. 
(R.38). 
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people would observe the cleanliness and operation of 
the station ( W. 34) , and also Texaco provided market-
ing information (W. 34). The only gasoline pumps 
on the premises were those with a Texaco trademark 
( T. 22) . Mr. Wheeler understood his lease could Le 
broken at any itme by either party, or continue as long 
as the parties wanted (W. 5). 
l\Ir. \Vorth \V. Simmons, the Division Service 
Representative of Texaco, had established criteria for 
obtaining operators for their stations ( T. 4). He also 
indicated each applicant must be analyzed by Texaco 
and that two men from Texaco had approved \Vheeler 
( T. 4). He indicated that normally Texaco would sup-
ply all gasoline products for a station as well as provide 
tires and accessories ( T. 6-8). Further, Texaco en-
courages the wearing of a Texaco uniform ( T. 8). 
\¥heeler wore such a uniform (T. 9). Mr. Simmons 
indicated that he had inspected the station to see if it 
was clean (T. 10), and further the premises would be 
inspected to see if they were safe because Texaco had 
an obligation to maintain the building (T. 10, 11). In 
addition to the lease, a products sales agreement was 
entered into (R. 53, Exhibit P-3). This agreement was 
not available to counsel at the time Mr. Simmons' depo-
sition was taken (T. 7, 8). 
Mr. Simmons indicated Texaco gave marketing 
help ( T. 19) , and encouraged the opera tor to buy from 
Texaco and that it was customary for an operator to 
obtain his needs from Texaco ( T. 20). He indicated 
6 
Texaco would "try to sell" the operator on meeting 
Texaco standards, and a lease might be cancelled if 
they were not met (T. 21). 
The lease between Texaco and Steed and 'Vheeler 
(Exhibit A, R. 51), provided it was cancellable at will, 
that lessee would not leave the station vacant for over 
48 hours, lessee was to maintain the premises in good 
repair and in a "safe condition", and that assignment 
or sublease could not occur without the permission of 
Texaco. The sales agreement ( R. 53, Exhibit P. :J) , 
provided for a maximum delivery of gasoline, proYided 
for 30 days notice of termination, but would terminate 
on cancellation of the lease. The purchaser, 'Vheeler 
and Steed, could not sell products purchased from 
others under Texaco's trademark, nor mix or co-mingle 
products. The only pumps and signs at the station were 
marked Texaco. The manner of delivery of the gasoline 
was specified, and the operators were required to com-
ply with applicable federal rules of the Surgeon General 
on handling tetra ethyl lead gasoline, and instruct 
its employees. 
All the appellant's witnesses testified Texaco did 
not set hours of operation, or control the hiring or 
firing of personnel, require reports or prevent pur-
chasing products from other sources. 
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POINT I 
THE APPEAL SHOULD BE DIS.MISSED 
AS I.MPROYIDENTLY GRANTED. 
Rule 72 (b) U.R.C.P. provides for appeals from 
interlocutory orders. In this case appellant seeks review 
from the denial of its motion for summary judgment, 
although no answer was filed, at the time of taking the 
depositions important documents were not available to 
counsel, the depositions and other evidence does not 
reflect extensive treatment of the question of the rela-
tionship between Texaco and other defendants, and 
counsel, during the depositions, refused to allow inquiry 
into relevant matters. It is submitted that in this posture 
the record is not ripe for consideration of the issue of 
whether summary judgment should have been granted. 
In Dupler v. Yates, 10 Utah :.?d 251, 351 P2d fi:Z-t 
( 1960) , this Court handed down a landmark decision 
on summary judgment. However, the facts of that 
case seem to clearly show. a full and thorough treatment 
of the issues. Several pages of the opinion demonstrate 
the exhaustive exploration of the issues and indicate 
the fact that if full consideration has been given to 
an issue in the discovery process, it may be ripe for 
determination if there is no genuine issue of fact. This 
Court observed: 
"Rule 56 U.R.C .P. is not intended to provide 
a substitute for the regular trial of cases in which 
there are disputed issues of fact upon which the 
outcome of the litigation depends. And it should 
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be invoked with caution to the end that litigants 
may be afforded a trial where there exists be-
tween them a bona fide dispute of material fact. 
However, where the moving party's e"\'identiary 
material is in itself sufficient and the opposing 
party fails to proffer any evi<lentiary matter 
when he is presumably in a position to do so, 
the courts should be justified in concluding that 
no genuine issue of fact is present, nor would 
one be present at the trial." 
Iu this case a reading of the record and briefs of 
the parties discloses issues of fact, and that the depo-
sitions when taken were not complete treatments of 
the issue. No answer had been filed by the appellant. 
Appellant has only interrogated one witness of the 
respondent, and then with little view to the issue now 
before the court. Obviously, the record, which is pos-
sibly incomplete, does not provide a proper posture 
for review by this Court. See, Note on Dupler v. Yates, 
7 Utah L. Rev. 251 (1961). In, Leininger v. Stearns-
Roger Manufacforing Co., 17 Utah 2d 37, 404 P2d 33 
( 1965) , this Court, speaking through .Judge Ruggeri, 
stated: 
"Summary judgment is not a substitute for 
trial, but is rather a jw:Jicial search for deter-
mining whether genuine issues exist as to ma-
terial facts." 
In Controlled Receivables, Inc. v. Harman, 17 
Utah 2d 420, 413 P2d 807 (1966), this Court acknowl-
edged that summary judgment was a harsh measure 
and should be sparingly used, also .Justice '"' ade con-
tended that since the Dupler decision the Court had 
9 
unwarrantedly expanded the effect of Rule 56, U.R.-
C.P. It is therefore sullmiltcd U1at this case should not 
be considered ripe for stunmary judgment because of the 
absence of such discovery as would allow a conclusion 
that the trial court shoul<l have ruled to the contrary. 
In Manwill v. Oyler, 11 Utah 2d 433, 361 P2d 
177 ( 1961), this ourt stated with reference to the pur-
pose for interlocutory review: 
"The purpose to be serYed in granting an in-
terlocutory appeal is to get directly at and dis-
pose of the issues as quickly as possible consistent 
with thoroughness and efficiency in the adminis-
tration of justice. llut that objective is not al-
ways served by granting such an appeal. In 
some instances, the necessity of remanding for 
trial may result in protracting rather than short-
ening the litigation. For this reason, whenever 
it appears likely that the matters in dispute can 
be finally disposed of upon a trial; or where they 
may become moot; or where they can, without 
involving any serious difficulty, abide determi-
nation in the event of an appeal after the trial, 
the desired objective is best served by refusing 
to entertain an interlocutory appeal and letting 
the case proceed to trial. Then, if an appeal is 
necessary, there is this additional advantage: the 
issues of facts have been determined and the 
record is viewed in the light most favorable to 
the judgment, instea(l of the reverse." 
It is submitted that the record in this case, when 
viewed in light of the objectives of interlocutory appeal, 
does not justify the Court in reviewing the issues raised. 
The respondent is not attempting to reargue the ques-
10 
tion of whether interlocutory appeal should be granted, 
but rather is saying that now that the record is actually 
before the Court, instead of the statements of counsel. 
the case does not appear to be in a proper posture for 
review and the appeal should be dismissed as having 
been improperly granted. 
The trial Court found conflict of fact, and was 
apparently also of the opinion that discovery had not 
developed the case sufficient to allow a summary judg-
ment proceeding to determine the issues between the 
parties. In a similar instance the United States Supreme 
Court has felt the case was not ripe for interlocutory 
review. 111 Su.:it.~erland Cheese Association v. E. 
Horne,s Market, Inc., ____ US ____ , 87 S. Ct. 193 (Nov. 
7, 1966) , the Court ruled that an order denying sum-
mary judgment was not the type of interlocutory order 
allowing for intermediate review. It observed: 
"'Ve take the other view not because "inter-
locutory" or preliminary may not at times em-
brace denials of permanent injunctions, but 
because the denial of a motion for summary 
judgment because of unresolved issues of fact 
does not settle or even tentatively decide any-
thing about the merits of the claim. It is strictly 
a pretrial order that decides only one thing-
that the case should go to trial. Orders that in no 
way touch on the merits of the claii:i but o:ily 
relate to pretrial procedures are not m our view 
"interlocutory" within the meaning of § 1292 
(a) ( l). ,;v~ see no othe~ way to protect .the 
integrity of the congressional policy agamst 
piecemeal appeals". 
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It is respectfully submitted that this appeal should 
be dismissed as improvidently granted. 
POINT II 
THE EVIDENCE DISCLOSES SUFFI-
CIENT FACTUAL ISSUES AS "\VARRANT 
TRIAL AND THE RECORD DISCLOSES EVI-
DENCE SUFFICIENT TO RAISE A JURY 
QUESTION AS TO TEXACO'S LIABILITY. 
It is well settled that summary judgment will not 
lie if there are conflicts in the facts of a case which 
would allow a jury to make a determination in favor 
of either party. Thus, in Controlled Receivables, Inc. 
v. Harrnan, Supra, this Court observed: 
"A motion for summary judgment is a harsh 
measure, and for this reason plaintiff's conten-
tions must be considered in a light most to his 
advantage and all doubts resolved in favor of 
permitting him to go to trial; and only if when 
the whole matter is so viewed, he could, neverthe-
less, establish no right to recovery, should the 
motion be granted." 
Ct. Bridge v. Back1nan, 10 Utah 2d 366, 353 P2d 
909 (1960). 
It is of course well stablished that a person is not 
normally liable for the negligence of an independent 
contractor, Restatement, Torts 2nd ~ 409. Further it 
is equally well settled that determination of whether 
a person is an independent contractor or an employee 
12 
is to a great extent a matter of the control exercised 
or capable of exercise by the party sought to be held 
for the act of another. Dowsett v. Dowsett, 116 Utah 
12, 207 P2d 809 ( 1949) ; Ouerhansly v. Travelers Ins. 
Co., 5 Utah 2d 15, 29.5 P2d 1093 (1956). Further, 
many courts have taken opposite positions on the issue 
of whether an oil company is liable for negligence of 
a service station operator acting under the trade name 
or sponsorship of the oil company. Anno. 83 ALR2d 
1282. 
The special marketing structure of the retail gaso-
line and oil business makes the traditional concepts of 
agency and independent contractor difficult of appli-
cation. Often the marketing arrangement is based on 
anti-trust problems and avoiding unprofitable business 
arrangements rather than factors relevant to deter-
mining tort liability. See Anno. 83 ALR 1282, 1284<. 
Further, it is submitted that the trend of cases is towards 
recognizing that the business relationship between an oil 
company and retail seller should not necessarily be the 
determinative factor in adjudicating tort liability, but 
the realities of the relationship should be appraised to 
see if the relationship is one where the oil company 
should be held responsible. 
The facts of this case, when viewed most favorable 
to the plaintiff's case, quite clearly present a question 
for resolution at trial. The appellant had a responsi-
bility for making certain the building was properly 
maintained ( T. IO). Safety inspections of the premises 
13 
were ma<le by representatiws of Texaco (T. 10). Aftc;· 
the fire, Texaco eff ecte<l the needed repairs (to the 
extent the record allows in view of appellant's counsel's 
instruction not to answer such questions). Texaco en-
couraged 'Vheeler and others to wear the Texaco uni-
form, which 'Vheeler did. If the station were not prop-
erly maintained, the rights of VVheeler could be sum-
marily terminated similar to an employee. Texaco 
encouraged the operator to identify with its product. 
The only pumps on the station premises bore the Texaco 
trademark, and sale of any other product under the 
Texaco trademark was forbidden. The manner and 
nature of delivery of products was under Texaco's 
control. It was customary for the operators to buy all 
items for sale from Texaco (T. 20). Texaco set up 
criteria for operators, and in effect hired them rather 
than negotiated with them. Operators went to a Texaco 
school where they received instruction on marketing, 
operations and safety instruction. Regular visits were 
made by Texaco personnel to inspect and service the 
needs of the station. There were no articles of partner-
ship between Steed and 'Vheeler, nor had they ever 
bothered to file a statement of doing business under 
a fictitious name< 1). All documents evidencing the 
relationship of the parties were prepared by Texaco 
on standard forms. A large Texaco sign was the mn,ior 
evidence to the public of the company running the 
station. The only other sign on the premises-S & 'V 
(1) This fac'r would ;y0clude rr•J~ecu 1 j0;1 of a suit ind~pend~ntly 
by Steed and Wheeler if they wc;-e in fac~~domg busmess mde-
pendently, 42-2-10, Ut::ih C0dr- ,\wn. l 9~·.:i 
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Texaco Senice-seemed to clearly show Texarn's in-
volvement in the operation of the station. The format 
and desigu of the station were in accord with Texaco 
standards. Finally, the lease between Steed, \Vheeler 
and Texaco required the former to keep the premises 
in a "clean, safe, and healthful condition". Taking 
all of these facts together, it is obvious that a jury 
question exists, and a jury would be acting reasonably 
in finding liability against Texaco based upon the full 
extent of the relationship and involvement of the appel-
lant. Restatement of .• {qency, 2nd § 220 and Intro. 
note Ch. 7, Top. 2, Tit. B. 
Under circumstances similar to those above, many 
courts hai,'e found the relationship between an oil com· 
pany and a service station to be of such a nature that 
the oil company should be held liable for the torts of 
the service station personnel, Anno. 116 ALR 4<57; 
Anno. 83 ALR2d 1282. 
InBoronsk~ v. The 'l'exas Company, 183 NE2d 
127 (Mass. 1962), an arrangement under a lease simi-
lar to that in the instant case was held to impose liability 
upon the Texas Company for damage sustained by 
plaintiff from leaking gasoline on the premises of the 
service station. A claim comparable to that now made 
by Texaco was rejected by the Massachusetts Court. 
The court found the evidence sufficient to submit to 
the jury.< 1) 
( 1) The case also points up another errM which occurred during 
the taking of the depositions when counsel for both def~ndant 
parties contended that the documents could .not be van~d by 
parol evidence. Of course, such a parol evidence rule 1s not 
applicable to third parties. 
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A recent Califoruia case, Gonzales v. Derrinytu11, 
10 Cal. Rptr. 700 ( 1961), the court discussed the cases 
in detail in which liability had been imposed again:it 
the station owner. The court held that since the com-
pany maintained reasonable control over the manner 
of delivery of the gasoline and the nature of the opera-
tions of its distributor, a factual question for the jury 
to resolve was presented and the jury's determination 
would not be upset on appeal. 
ln Humble Oil and llefininy Co. v. Martin, 148 
Tex. 175, 222 S\V2d 995 (1949), the court ruled the 
oil company was liable when a filling station attendant 
negligently allowed a car to roll down an incline and 
strike the plaintiff. The filling station operator exer-
cised control over the hiring and firing of personnel, 
but the relationship of the oil company was held to 
raise a sufficient issue of control as to warrant the 
matter being submitted to the jury. The court distin-
guished other Texas cases on their facts. In the instant 
case, safety inspection was made by Texaco. Texaco 
did set a requirement that the station could not be 
closed for a period in excess of 48 hours, and generally 
exercised some degree of control over the station so 
that it could have corrected unsafe practices. 
A similar conclusion that the question was one for 
the jury was reached in Standard Oil Co. v. Gentry, 
241 Ala. 62, 1 So 2d 29 (1941), where the court relied 
upon the fact that Standard Oil reall~T advertised itself 
at the station. A similar conclusion can be drawn from 
the position of the Restatement of Torts 2nd § 429. 
16 
In Edwards v. Gulf Oil Co., 69 Ga. App. 140, 
~4 SE2d 843 ( 1943), the court ruled that a prima facie 
case was made out against the oil company where the 
operator wore a uniform bearing Gulf's name and in-
signia, and had Gulf signs on the pumps and building, 
and passed out Gulf literature. The court ruled it error 
to non-suit plaintiff against Gulf. Similar results were 
reached by the Missouri Courts in R,ljan v. Standard 
Oil Co., 144 SW2d 170 (Mo. App. 1940); and Brenner 
v. Socony Vacuum Oil Co., 236 Mo. App. 524, 158 
S'V2d 171 (1942}. 
In Phillips Petro!eum Co. v. Hooper, 164 F2d 
743 (5th Cir. 1947), the court applying Texas la1v 
said the question of the liability of the company and 
the issue of control was properly one for the jury to 
determine. 
In the instant case when the full extent of Texaco's 
participation is viewed it is obvious the public would 
feel the station was under Texaco supervision, which 
it was, and that unsafe conditions on the premises would 
not be tolerated. Under facts comparable to this case, 
the only humane and proper result is to recognize that 
a company may not sell under its trademark, give classes 
of instruction on service station operation, make safetr 
and other inspections, have right to terminate the 
lessee's relationship at will, require that safe premises 
be maintained, and then contend it owes no duty to 
the station patrons. The cases cited by appellant are 
in many instances distinguishable on their facts or 
otherwise doctrinally opposed to reality. 
17 
It is submitted the trial court's determinatiot1 
should be upheld. 
CONCLUSION 
The facts of this case and the posture of the record 
on appeal require either the affirmance of the trial 
court's ruling that the question of liability of appellant 
should await trial, or that the case should be dismissed 
on the grounds that the appeal was improvidentlr 
granted. There are no circumstances warranting the 
relief requested by appellant. 
Respectfully submitted, 
CLYDE, 1\1ECHA1\1 & PRATT 
RONALD N. BOYCE 
ROLAND R. vVRIGHT 
Attorneys for Plaintiff 
and Respondent Don Foster. 
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